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THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY AND THE OLD 
CONSTITUTION: THE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
John C. Yoo* 
A noted scholar on foreign affairs law has declared, " [ n ]o 
provision in any treaty has been held unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court and few have been seriously challenged there." 1 
The Constitution appears to subject treaties and executive 
agreements to the same limitations that apply to all other ac-
tions of the federal government.2 Further, the first principles of 
constitutionalism seem to dictate that the federal government 
cannot evade the Constitution simply because it acts through the 
process of presidential ratification and senatorial consent, rather 
than through bicameralism and presentment.3 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court's record on foreign relations is littered with 
cases in which the Court arguably stretched the law in order to 
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1. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 7 (Foundation Press, 1972). 
Events of the last 25 years have not changed the truth of this observation. See Louis 
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 185 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 1996). 
2. See Reid v. Coven, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitution bars court martial of civil-
ian spouses who murdered servicemen-husbands). 
3. As Justice Black wrote "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power 
on the Congress, or on any other branch of government, which is free from the restraints 
of the Constitution ... The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all 
branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or 
by the Executive and the Senate combined." I d. at 16-17. 
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find that an international agreement did not violate a structural 
provision of the Constitution.4 
Last year's ratification of the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion ("CWC")5 presents this same tension between the require-
ments of the structural Constitution and the demands of the na-
tion's international obligations. The Convention bans not only 
the current use and possession of chemical weapons, but also re-
search, development, and production of such arms in the future. 
Because of the dual civilian and military uses of several poten-
tially banned chemicals, verification procedures have become 
the critical issue for the success of the treaty. To enforce the 
prohibition on chemical weapons now and in the future, the 
Convention imposes the most intrusive verification procedures 
yet seen in a multilateral arms control agreement. In particular, 
the ewe establishes a new international organization that will 
enjoy the power to conduct snap inspections on almost any mili-
tary or civilian site within a state party's territory. 
Implementation of this treaty scheme will face difficult 
challenges due to the Constitution's checks on the power of the 
federal government and its guarantees for the individual rights 
of the citizenry. Others have identified the constitutional prob-
lem raised by the CWC's provisions for warrantless searches of 
American industrial and business sites.6 This Essay will focus on 
a deeper structural issue: whether the Constitution-in particu-
lar, the Appointments Clause-permits individuals who are not 
4. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (migratory bird treaty does 
not violate state sovereignty and Tenth Amendment); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981) (executive agreement suspending and transferring American claims 
against Iran authorized by Congress, even though International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act failed to provide authority). 
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 21, 103d Cong.,1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 800 (1993) ("CWC"). 
6. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Political and 
Constitutional Issues, 15 Const. Comm. 131 (1998); David G. Gray, Note, "Then the 
Dogs Died": The Fourth Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 567 (1994); David A. Koplow, The Shadow and Substance of 
Law: How the United States Constitution Will Affect the Implementation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance: 
The Chemical Weapons Convention 155-79 (Westview Press, 1993); Edward A. 
Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the 
United States, 13 Yale J. Inti. L. 21 (1988); David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: 
Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
229 (1988). As with so many of the issues involving foreign affairs and the Constitution, 
many of these problems were identified long ago by Louis Henkin. Louis Henkin, Arms 1 
Control and Inspection in American Law 255 (Columbia U. Press, 1958). 
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officers of the national government to exercise authority under 
federal law that affects the rights of American citizens.7 
Long overlooked, the Appointments Clause has received 
increased scrutiny of late. In several recent opinions, the Su-
preme Court has found that the Constitution requires that any 
individual who exercises substantial government authority and 
discretion must undergo appointment in accordance with the 
procedures of Article II, Section 2.8 Although one might read 
the Appointments Clause, as the Court has noted, "as merely 
dealing with etiquette or protocol," it is clear that "the drafters 
had a less frivolous purpose in mind. "9 This purpose was two-
fold: first, to prevent any single branch from manipulating fed-
eral appointments~ and second, to ensure that those making ap-
pointments would ultimately be accountable to the people of the 
United States.10 As this Essay will demonstrate, the Court's cur-
rent approach to the Appointments Clause comports both with 
the framers' original understanding of the Clause as a check on 
national power, and with the Constitution's structural goal of 
preserving democratic self-government and public accountabil-
ity. 
These understandings of the Appointments Clause-both 
modern and historical-pose a difficult obstacle to the CWC's 
verification procedures. If the President and the Senate 
authorize an international organization to conduct searches on 
American soil, they will have delegated public authority outside 
the governmental system established by the Constitution. 
Vesting such authority in officials who are not officers of the 
United States risks offending both the fundamental principle of 
popular sovereignty underlying our Constitution11 and the Ap-
pointment Clause's basic goal of government accountability. 
The case of the CWC, however, also highlights certain ambigui-
7. The Appointments Clause declares that the President "shall nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law." U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2. 
8. See Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 114 S. 
Ct. 752 (1994); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988); Bowsher. v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125. 
10. See, e.g., Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring). 
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 
(1987); Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (U. of North 
Carolina Press, 1969). 
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ties in the Court's approach to the Appointments Clause that 
may suggest ways to conform the treaty to the Constitution. 
Following this introduction, this Essay will proceed in three 
parts. Part I will describe the CWC's verification procedures 
and its implementing legislation, which is presently before Con-
gress. Part II will examine the Court's case law interpreting the 
Appointments Clause and the broader constitutional principles 
of democratic self-government that support it. Part III will dis-
cuss ways in which the Clause applies to the CWC, and will ex-
amine possible solutions to the CWC's constitutional problems. 
I 
The CWC seeks to achieve the ambitious goal of eliminat-
ing chemical weapons by establishing an intrusive verification 
mechanism unprecedented for a multilateral treaty. State par-
ties undertake the primary obligation of renouncing the use, de-
velopment, acquisition, or production of chemical weapons.12 
They also agree to destroy any chemical weapons and produc-
tion facilities currently within their jurisdiction and control.13 
Verification is of crucial importance to the success of the 
ewe because, unlike other arms control agreements, the ewe 
goes beyond numerical caps on weapon stockpiles or limitations 
on weapon use in warfare. Instead, the ewe seeks to impose a 
complete ban on the development, production, and stockpiling 
of an entire class of weapons. The ease with which chemical 
weapons can be manufactured and concealed presents a difficult 
challenge for any verification system. Lethal substances such as 
mustard gas, for example, can be manufactured in a vat with two 
common industrial chemicals.14 Detection of prohibited facili-
12. ewe, Art. I, para. 1 (cited in note 5). A valuable reference work on the Con-
vention with commentary on each provision is Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A 
Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1994). 
13. ewe, Art. I, para. 2, 4 (cited in note 5). Earlier efforts to regulate chemical 
weapons had prohibited only their use in warfare, but not their production, storage, and 
deployment. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 
26 U.S.T 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. Moreover, these earlier chemical weap-
ons agreements had failed to establish any verification mechanisms. Earlier attempts to 
control chemical weapons may have neglected to implement a verification procedure 
because during the interwar period "the 'politesse' of relations between nations seemed 
to require at least the pretense that they, like gentlemen, could of course be trusted to 
keep their agreements." Henkin, Arms Control at 47 (cited in note 6). 
14. On the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, see generally Kathleen C. 
Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms Control Challenge of the 
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ties is also difficult because production sites can be "dual use;" 
in other words, civilian chemical plants can easily switch to the 
production of chemical weapons, and vice-versa.15 
A cheating nation can conceal a chemical weapons facility 
in an extremely small space. A laboratory no more than 1600 
square feet in size can manufacture one hundred tons of chemi-
cal weapons in one year.16 Successfully verifying compliance 
with the CWC will require monitoring all sites that use and pro-
duce civilian chemicals, in addition to the usual military and de-
fense contractor sites that are the subject of other arms control 
agreements. 17 
Additional challenges are created by the multilateral nature 
of the treaty. A multilateral agreement with many parties of 
disparate resources and interests will produce difficult enforce-
ment and verification problems. Smaller nations will not have 
the ability to verify compliance of the treaty by other nations, 
and thus they will be forced to rel~ upon international verifica-
tion organizations and methods. 1 Because the low cost of 
chemical weapons make them a "poor man's atomic bomb," the 
incentive for less advanced nations to cheat so as to achieve stra-
tegic parity with more developed countries is probably higher 
than in a bilateral arrangement between parties of equal 
strength. 
In order to overcome these challenges, the Convention cre-
ates a verification mechanism that reaches not just manufactur-
ers of chemical weapons, but also most producers and users of 
industrial chemicals. According to the congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment, potentiall~ 10,000 sites in the United 
States qualify for CWC inspection. 9 Under the so-called chal-
lenge procedures of the Convention, potentially any facility or 
location in the nation-whether involved in the chemical indus-
90's (V. of Illinois Press, 1991); Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Tech-
nical Background (Cambridge U. Press, 1992). 
15. Address by Vice President George Bush to the Conference on Disarmament: 
Chemical Weapons Convention, April 18, 1984, quoted in Tanzman, 13 Yale J. Inti. L. 
23 (cited in note 6). 
16. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons at 19-20 (cited in note 14); Gray, 94 Colum. L. 
Rev. at 575-76 (cited in note 6). 
17. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in 
Morel and Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance at 17-36 (cited in note 6). 
18. Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust but Verify": The Production of Information in 
Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 Cornell Inti. L.J. 1, 57 
(1993). 
19. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention: Effects on the United States Chemical Industry 15 (1993) ("OTA Study"). 
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try or not-might be subject to search. According to the treaty, 
challenge inspections can reach "any facility or location in the 
territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction" of a state 
party.20 Many if not most of these factories, industrial sites, and 
other locations will not be under the direct control of the United 
States government, but instead will be in the hands of private 
commercial enterprises and companies.21 
The Convention provides for three basic types of verifica-
tion for sites that produce or store chemical weapons or desig-
nated chemicals. First, state parties are required to provide an-
nual, detailed reports on facilities that could produce chemical 
weapons.22 Second, sites involved in the chemical industry are 
subject to on-site inspections.23 Third, any state party can de-
mand a "challenge" inspection of any location within the juris-
diction of another party.24 The Convention also creates a new 
international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons.25 The Organization's Technical Secre-
tariat will choose the targets for inspection and will conduct the 
searches. 26 This discussion will focus on the legal issues posed by 
the on-site and challenge searches, which allow members of the 
Technical Secretariat to enter and search sites on American soil. 
On-site inspections monitor facilities that produce sub-
stances that either have been used as, or could help create, 
chemical weapons. Facilities are classified into four groups 
based upon the potential dangerousness of the chemical pro-
duced; the intrusiveness and regularity of inspections depend on 
which classification a facility receives. For example, a facility 
that manufactures a "Schedule 1" substance, which has been 
used as a chemical weapon in the past, is limited as to the pro-
duction amount and use of the chemical and is subject to regular 
on-site searches and monitoring.Z7 Schedule 2 and 3 facilities, 
which receive less intrusive monitoring, produce less lethal 
chemicals that still might be used to create chemical weapons. If 
a facility manufactures chemicals that fall within the broader, 
"Other" category, which includes many organic chemicals that 
have not been used as chemical weapons in the past, it is subject 
20. ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5). 
21. OTA Study at 19-32 (cited in note 19). 
22. ewe. Art. VI (cited in note 5). 
23. Id. 
24. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5). 
25. ewe, Art. VIII (cited in note 5). 
26. ewe. Art. VIII, Part D (cited in note 5). 
27. ewe, Verification Annex, Part VI (cited in note 5). 
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to random targeting and inspection by the Technical Secretariat. 
While there may be only a few dozen Schedule 1 facilities in the 
nation, Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimates 
that there are more than 10,000 sites in the United States that 
fall within the Other category.28 
While some details of the search procedures are left to fu-
ture development, the ewe reserves broad inspection rights to 
the Technical Secretariat inspection teams. Inspection teams 
must be permitted to enter the state party through a designated 
point of entry.29 According to the CWC Verification Annex, the 
inspection team enjoys "the right to unimpeded access to the in-
spection site," and the signatory nation has an obligation to 
grant the team transportation and entrance to the facility to be 
searched.30 Inspection teams may interview facility personnel, 
collect samples, inspect documents and records, take photo-
graphs, and bring testing equipment into the facility. Govern-
ment personnel of the state party may not impede the inspec-
tion, although they may observe certain searches. 
Of course, on-site inspections and continuous monitoring 
will only deter treaty violations at known chemical facilities. In 
cases where a nation is suspected of operating a hidden or unde-
clared weapons facility, the ewe relies upon challenge inspec-
tions to enforce its terms. Each state party has the right to de-
mand an on-site inspection of any location within the 
jurisdiction of another party. "Without delay," the inspected na-
tion is to provide the search team with unimpeded access to the 
facility in question and is required to allow a representative of 
the challenging nation to observe the inspection.31 The search 
itself is to be conducted "in the least intrusive manner possible," 
and its purpose is solely to determine "facts relating to possible 
non-compliance. "32 The Convention sets no numerical limits on 
the number of challenge searches that one nation may demand 
of another .33 
28. OTA Study at 15 (cited in note 19). 
29. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II (cited in note 5). The Secretariat must no-
tify the state concerning the site to be searched and the type of inspection. I d. 
30. ld. 
31. CWC, Art. IX (cited in note 5). 
32. ld. 
33. The Convention attempts to provide some procedural safeguards to prevent 
abuse of challenge inspections. A state may demand a challenge inspection "for the sole 
purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance 
with the provisions of' the Convention, it must keep the inspection "within the scope" of 
the Convention, and it must provide information to support its inspection demand. 
ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5). The challenging nation must provide its reasons for the 
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A nation undergoing a challenge search is permitted to take 
measures to protect "sensitive installations" and to prevent dis-
closure of "confidential information and data, not related" to 
the Convention.34 Furthermore, the Convention contains a pro-
vision that a state party's obligation to provide access in re-
sponse to a challenge is "to take into account any constitutional 
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or 
searches and seizures."35 Apparently, this provision allows a 
state party to raise a warrant requirement or a potential takings 
claim as a ground for seeking modification to a challenge inspec-
tion.36 But this is by no means clear, nor is it obvious how the 
provision would operate. Further, the Convention declares that 
an inspected state cannot use constitutional obligations "to con-
ceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohib-
ited under" the Convention.37 
Implementing legislation proposed in Congress guarantees 
that ewe officials will have full access to inspection sites, and it 
places some reasonable limitations on the scope of the searches. 
Not yet passed by Congress, the legislation authorizes the Tech-
nical Secretariat to conduct inspections of U.S. facilities, with 
American officials along as company. Under the bill it is illegal 
"for any person to fail or refuse to permit entry or ins~ection, or 
to disrupt, delay or otherwise impede an inspection." 8 Federal 
courts are authorized to restrain violations and to compel com-
pliance with the Convention and its implementing legislation. A 
search warrant process is established for challenge searches, but 
not for the on-site inspections of identified facilities (i.e. Sched-
demand to the Executive Council of the Convention, which can block a challenge re-
quest by a three-quarters majority vote. ewe, Verification Annex, Part IX (cited in 
note 5). The Council, however, can reject the request only if it considers the inspection 
demand to be "frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope" of the Convention. 
CWC, Art. IX (cited in note 5). 
34. ewe, Art. IX (cited in note 5). 
35. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5). 
36. Gray, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 6). 
37. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X (cited in note 5). 
38. H.R. 1590, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1997); see also S. 610, 105th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 306 (1997). H.R. 1590 parallels the ewe implementing legislation introduced, 
but not passed, in the 104th Cong. See S. 1732, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). S. 610, 
which passed the Senate on May 23, 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. S5080, differs in some signifi-
cant respects from H.R. 1590. S. 610, for example, requires that the United States seek 
facility agreements for all schedule 2 and 3 facilities, that the government seek consent 
before a search, and that the government receive an administrative search warrant be-
fore an inspection should the consent not be given. S. 610 also appears to make interna-
tional inspectors liable for illegal disclosure of confidential information. 
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ule 1 through Other sites).39 These latter searches, however, 
must "be commenced and completed with reasonable prompt-
ness and shall be conducted at reasonable times, within reason-
able limits, and in a reasonable manner."40 Inspections may ex-
tend to anything within the premises that is "related to" the 
requirements of the Convention, but the bill protects certain 
proprietary information and trade secrets from inspection.41 
Several elements of the verification regime are worth not-
ing at this stage. First, the inspections are conducted by officials 
of the Technical Secretariat, not by American officials. Mem-
bers of the Secretariat choose the sites to be inspected, accord-
ing to standards that they develop. There is no provision for re-
view of a decision to search by any American official, aside from 
the optional warrant procedure. Members of the Technical Sec-
retariat are not accountable to any American official, they can-
not be removed by any American official, and they do not take 
orders from any American official. 
Such independence is the critical component of the ewe's 
innovative multilateral verification regime. The ewe is a wa-
tershed in the development of arms control verification methods 
because of its attempt to render national governments transpar-
ent. Traditional international agreements place obligations 
upon the national governments of the state parties, which as-
sume the responsibility for enforcing treaty terms upon their 
citizens. The ewe seeks to sidestep national governments by 
conducting direct inspections of privately-owned facilities and 
sites. Searches by the Technical Secretariat are to take place 
without reliance upon the government of a treaty party; a state 
party's intervention is required only to assist the inspection 
teams in enjoying unfettered access to a facility. 
These verification procedures are designed to address the 
problem created by national governments that cannot be trusted 
39. Section 406(a) requires that the agency working with the Technical Secretariat 
seek the consent of the owner or operator of a facility to the inspection. The Section 
also states that the agency "may seek" a search warrant from an authorized official, who 
presumably will be a federal judge or magistrate. These proceedings, which are ex 
parte, require that the agency provide information concerning the basis for selection of 
the site for inspection, including evidence and reasons provided by a challenging state. 
Section 406(a)(2) requires the authorized official to issue the warrant upon an affidavit 
showing that the Convention is in force, that the site is subject to inspection under the 
C~mvention, that the procedures of the Convention and of the Act have been complied 
wtth, and that the inspection will be conducted in a reasonable manner. H.R. 1590, 
105th Cong., 1st Sess § 406(a) - (a)(2). 
40. I d. § 401 (d). 
41. Id. § 401(e)(2). 
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either to conduct meaningful verification themselves or to obey 
the treaty's restrictions. The CWC also attempts to build confi-
dence among the signatories by vesting the authority over im-
plementation in a neutral, impartial entity that is not beholden 
to any single nation or alliance.42 Such reassurance through veri-
fication helps to alleviate the fears of cheating produced by the 
prisoners' dilemma. Although perhaps desirable from a policy 
perspective, it is exactly the efforts of this neutral entity to 
monitor private parties that produces the constitutional difficul-
ties discussed in the remainder of this Essay. Vesting verifica-
tion in a neutral, impartial international organization may build 
assurance and trust among treaty partners, but it also creates 
tensions with fundamental constitutional principles of govern-
ment accountability. 
As will be discussed in the next Section, the Constitution 
erects limits on the ability of the federal government to transfer 
or delegate power to entities that are not directly responsible to 
the American people. Ratification and implementation of the 
Convention within the American legal system will require an 
understanding of these principles and the development of 
mechanisms to respect their requirements. 
II 
Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Ap-
pointments Clause declare that individuals who exercise federal 
authority must be appointed as federal officers. Efforts to vest 
verification authority in international organizations whose offi-
cials are not appointed by constitutional processes and are not 
subject to presidential control come into conflict with the 
Court's developing principles of government accountability. 
This Section will discuss the Supreme Court's approach to the 
Appointments Clause, the text and history of the provision, and 
the Constitution's structural requirement of government ac-
countability. 
Much of the academic writing on the Appointments Clause 
has focused on the balance of power struck by the Constitution 
when it vested the appointment power in both the President and 
the Senate.43 As the Supreme Court recently has recognized, 
42. See generally, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty (Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
43. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 Green Bag 2d 253 (1998); John 0. 
McGinnis, Essay, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Proc-
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however, the Clause also serves a much broader function than 
simply dividing power between the branches. By requiring that 
all officers of the United States undergo nomination and con-
firmation, the Constitution renders all officials who exercise 
federal power answerable to the people's elected representa-
tives, and ultimately to the people themselves. If the people 
disagree with the manner in which federal officials are enforcing 
the law, they can pressure the President and the Congress to 
seek their removal and replacement through the appointments 
process. 
A lHESUPREMECOURr ANDlHEAPPoiNIMENrSOAUSE 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution regulates 
the staffing of the federal government and the exercise of cer-
tain types of federal authority. According to the Clause, the 
President: 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Offi-
cers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 44 
The Appointments Clause is not just an anachronistic, out-
dated provision of the eighteenth century. It encompasses two 
objectives: to prevent the manipulation of appointments by any 
single branch of the national government; and to ensure ac-
countability.45 
1. Separation of Powers. The Court identified the Ap-
pointments Clause's role in maintaining the separation of pow-
ers in Buckley v. Valeo. 46 In part, Buckley raised the question of 
the constitutionality of the Federal Elections Commission 
(FEC), which was created to administer and enforce the Federal 
ess: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 633 (1993); David A. 
Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, The Constitution, and the Confirmation Proc· 
ess, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992); James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the 
Senate in Supreme Coun Appointments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1989). 
44. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl2. 
45. See Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752,765 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). 
46. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
98 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 15:87 
Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.47 Congress com-
posed the FEC of eight members, of which two were to be ap-
pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two by the Presi-
dent. Both the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 
House served ex officio without any right to vote.48 
In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that this arrange-
ment violated the Appointments Clause. Because Commission 
members exercised the powers of an officer of the United 
States, the Court concluded that they had to undergo nomina-
tion by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Even if the members of the Commission were to be considered 
"inferior officers," the Court noted, the Constitution still re-
quired that their appointment be vested in either the President, 
the courts, or a department head. According to the Court, the 
framers of the Constitution had specifically divided the ap-
pointment power between the President and Senate in order to 
prevent the Senate from enjoying the sole authority to appoint 
executive branch officials. Describing the Constitutional Con-
vention's decision to amend the Clause into its present form, the 
Court stated "that it was a deliberate change made by the fram-
ers with the intent to deny Congress any authority itself to ap-
point those who were 'Officers of the United States. "'49 
Relying upon several nineteenth century cases, the Court 
grouped all officials of the federal government into three basic 
classes.50 The first group encompasses principal Officers of the 
United States, who are nominated by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. A cabinet secretary would be an 
example of such an officer. The second category encompasses 
inferior Officers of the United States, such as postmasters first 
class and clerks of the federal courts.51 The Buckley Court 
47. The composition of the FEC was codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a). After Buckley 
invalidated the FEC's makeup, Congress altered the Commission's membership to in-
clude the Secretary of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives (or 
their designees) as ex officio members, and six members appointed by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate with no more than three members from any one 
political party. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1988). 
48. The presence of the ex officio members was subsequently invalidated as a vio-
lation of the separation of powers. Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Vic-
tory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Opinion of Silberman, J.), cert. granted, 114 S. 
Ct. 2703 (1994), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1995). 
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129. 
50. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879) ("The Constitution for pur-
poses of appointment ... divides all its officers into two classes."). 
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and 
Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 225 (1839)). 
1998] CWC AND THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 99 
placed all other federal employees in yet a third category, label-
ling them "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the 
United States."52 This third category would include the secre-
taries or law clerks of an officer of the United States. 
In Morrison v. Olson, 53 the Court provided further guidance 
concerning the relationships among these different classes of 
federal officials. Although it admitted that the line between a 
principal and an inferior officer was unclear, the Court found 
several factors that indicated that the independent counsel cre-
ated by the Ethics in Government Act54 fell into the latter cate-
gory. The independent counsel was inferior because she was 
subject to removal by a higher executive branch official, because 
she performed "only certain, limited duties," because her office 
was of a limited jurisdiction, and because her office had a lim-
ited tenure.55 Her status as an inferior officer allowed the Court 
to uphold the Act's placement of appointment authority over 
the independent counsel in a special federal court. 
In Buckley and Morrison, the Court emphasized the separa-
tion of powers aspects of the Appointments Clause. Both cases 
asked whether Congress could transfer appointment authority of 
a federal officer from the President and Senate to another 
branch of government. In Buckley, the Court rejected Con-
gress's attempt to arrogate appointment authority to itself, while 
in Morrison the Court upheld placement of the power to select 
an independent counsel in the federal judiciary. The two cases 
were different because the Buckley Court approached the Ap-
pointments Clause as a deliberate limitation upon Congress, due 
to the framers' fears "that the Legislative Branch of the Na-
tional Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the 
other two branches."56 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
Morrison, this threat was not present in the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, because Congress had transferred the appointment 
power to the Judiciary, rather than to itself. While concluding 
that such inter-branch appointments were constitutionally per-
missible, the Court still found some outer limits on Congress' 
ability to transfer power out of the executive branch. In par-
ticular, the Court found that Congress could not provide for in-
ter-branch appointments of inferior officers if such appoint-
52 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. 
53. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. 
55. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72. 
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129. 
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ments either impaired the constitutional functions of another 
branch, or reflected an incongruity between the function of the 
officer and the function of the appointing branch. 57 
In two cases decided last Term, the Court re-emphasized 
the Appointments Clause's role in containing congressional en-
croachment over official appointments. Edmond v. United 
State/8 involved a challenge to the composition of the Coast 
Guard criminal appeals court. That court contained two civilian 
judges who had not received presidential appointment pursuant 
to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, but instead were appointed by 
the Secretary of Transportation. 59 In deciding that the appoint-
ments were proper, the Court observed that the Appointments 
Clause "is among the significant structural safeguards of the 
constitutional scheme" because it "prevents congressional en-
croachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches."60 The 
Framers also designed the Clause in this way, Justice Scalia 
wrote for the Court, because they believed that "the President 
would be less vulnerable to interest-grouE pressure and personal 
favoritism than would a collective body." 1 
In Printz v. United States,62 the Court again stressed the Ap-
pointments Clause's function in protecting presidential control 
over the execution of the laws by preventing Congress from 
transferring such authority to non-federal officers. In invali-
dating the Brady Act's requirement that state officials conduct 
federal handgun background checks, the Court observed that 
this commandeering of state officials would violate not just fed-
eralism principles, but also the separation of powers.63 Allocat-
ing such federal responsibilities to state governments, the Court 
noted, would leave federal law enforcement without 
"meaningful Presidential control" and would undermine the ef-
fectiveness of a unitary executive.64 "That unity would be shat-
tered," the Court concluded, "and the power of the President 
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effec-
tively without the President as with him, by simply requiring 
state officers to execute its laws. "65 
57. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675·76. 
58. 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997). 
59. Id. at 1579. 
60. Id. 
61. ld. 
62. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
63. ld. at 2378. 
64. Id. 
65. ld. 
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2. Government Accountability. Buckley contained the seeds 
of a broader understanding of the Appointments Clause that 
embraces concerns about the general scope of national power 
and the manner in which that power may be exercised. Before 
the Clause's appointment process may even begin its work, it 
first must identify who must undergo such appointment. In ad-
dressing this question, the Court has declared that those who 
exercise significant government authority must be appointed 
pursuant to Article II, Section 2. By requiring appointment of 
such individuals, the Court has concluded, the Constitution pre-
vents the national government from blurring the lines of respon-
sibility between the people and their agents. As Chief Justice 
Rehn~uist declared for a unanimous Court in Ryder v. United 
States : "The [Appointments] Clause is a bulwark against one 
branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch, 
but it is more: it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's 
structural inteBrity by preventing the diffusion of the appoint-
ment power."' 
Buckley v. Valeo first articulated this link between the Ap-
pointments Clause and the overarching structure of the Consti-
tution. It is possible that the Buckley Court could have declared 
that an "Officer of the United States" referred to purely cere-
monial titles or only to military and law-enforcement officials, 
which would have left the appointment process for most federal 
positions up to Congress. In Buckley for example, the govern-
ment defended the constitutionality of the FEC by arguing that 
pursuant to its Necessary and Proper Clause powers, Congress 
could establish offices and could fill them in any manner it 
chose. In other words, Congress could have designated mem-
bers of the FEC as non-officers of the United States, thereby 
avoiding any Appointments Clause difficulties with the Ethics in 
Government Act. 
Buckley rejected that alternative interpretation and estab-
lished a structural analysis of government positions that linked 
the Appointments Clause to the legitimate exercise of federal 
power. Members of the Commission qualified as Officers, the 
Court found, because they enjoyed substantial power under fed-
eral law. "We think [the Clause's] fair import is that any ap-
pointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of 
the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, 
66. 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1991). 
67. ld. at 2035 (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,878 (1991)). 
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therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by §2, cl. 2, of" 
Article 11.68 If Congress attempts to vest federal authority in 
someone who is not an officer of the United States, the delega-
tion of authority will be invalid. Non-officers can exercise some 
authority, but only if those powers are within the legislative 
branch or do not involve enforcement of federallaw. 69 
The Court's Appointments Clause analysis thus proceeds in 
three steps. First, it asks whether the authority delegated by 
Congress involves "the administration and enforcement of the 
public law," where that public law is federal law. If so, then it 
must determine whether the individual who is given that power 
"exercises significant authority pursuant to the laws of the 
United States." If the individual does not exercise significant 
authority, then that person is a federal employee and not a fed-
eral officer. If the first two conditions are met, the Constitution 
requires compliance with the Appointments Clause. Otherwise, 
the individual is not an officer of the federal government and his 
actions pursuant to federal law are invalid. 70 
More recent Supreme Court decisions have further devel-
oped Buckley's structural themes. In Freytag v. Commissioner/' 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of special trial judges ap-
pointed by the chief judge of the Tax Court, an Article I court. 
In analyzing an Appointments Clause challenge, the Court 
found that the special trial judges were inferior officers due to 
their substantial authority to hear certain classes of cases.72 Be-
cause the Tax Court qualified as one of the nation's "Courts of 
Law" within the meaning of the Clause, however, the appoint-
ment of the trial judges by the chief judge satisfied constitu-
tional requirements.73 In passing on this issue, the Court linked 
the policies behind the Appointments Clause to the ideal of 
68. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
69. As the Buckley Court declared: 
Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Gause create 
"offices" in the generic sense and provide such method of appointment to those 
"offices" as it chooses. But Congress' power under that Clause is inevitably 
bounded by the express language of Art. II, §2, ct. 2, and unless the method it 
provides comports with the latter, the holders of those offices will not be 
''Officers of the United States." They may, therefore, properly perform duties 
only in aid of those functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an 
area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement of the pub-
lic law as to permit their being performed by persons not "Officers of the 
United States." 
ld. at 138-39. 
70. See Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995). 
71. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
72. Id. at 881-82. 
73. Id. at 888-92. 
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democratic government. Citing Gordon Wood's book, The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, the Court ob-
served that the framers had included the Appointments Clause 
in the Constitution to prevent the diversion of power to indi-
viduals not accountable to the electorate. According to the 
Court, manipulation of official appointments had been one of 
the signal grievances against executive power held by the revolu-
tionary generation. "Those who framed our Constitution," the 
Freytag majority declared, "addressed these concerns by care-
fully husbanding the appointment power to limit its diffusion."74 
While the framers divided the appointment power between 
the President and the Senate, they did so in order to guarantee 
democratic accountability over the process. "The framers un-
derstood ... that by limiting the appointment power, they could 
ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political 
force and the will of the people."75 Thus, the Constitution's only 
exception to this allocation of the appointment power was 
granted for inferior officers, the Court observed, and in that case 
only if Congress transferred the power to the President, the 
heads of departments, or the courts.76 The Court made the sec-
ondary purpose of the Clause quite clear when it declared that 
"[t]he structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause 
are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire 
Republic," and therefore "[n]either Congress nor the Executive 
can agree to waive this structural protection. ,n 
In two cases involving military courts-martial, the Justices 
have reaffirmed the Appointment Clause's purpose in enhanc-
ing democratic accountability. In Weiss v. United States,78 the 
Court answered the question whether military officers had to re-
ceive a second appointment in order to serve as military judges. 
Both the parties and the Court agreed that "because of the 
authority and responsibilities they possess," military judges "act 
as 'officers' of the United States," and therefore had to be ap-
pointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause.79 In finding that 
a second appointment was unnecessary, the Court determined 
that Congress was not attempting either to arrogate appoint-
ment power to itself or to transfer authority outside of the po-
74. ld. at 883. 
75. Id. at 884. 
76. ld. at 884-85. 
77. ld. at 880. 
78. 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994). 
79. ld. at 757. 
104 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 15:87 
litical branches. "[T]here is no ground for suspicion here that 
Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a 
particular individual to fill the office. Nor has Congress effected 
a 'diffusion of the appointment power,' about which this Court 
expressed concern in Freytag. "80 
Concurrences by Justices Souter and Scalia in Weiss further 
revealed the Court's thinking on this second, "anti-diffusion" 
aspect of the Appointments Clause. According to Justice 
Souter, two principles lie at the heart of the Appointments 
Clause. First, the Clause prohibits any single branch from ag-
grandizing its appointment authority at the expense of another; 
this is the familiar separation of powers theme at work in 
Buckley. Second, "no Branch may abdicate its Appointments 
Clause duties" by transferring appointment authority to entities 
not included in the Clause.81 
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Souter's two-tier analysis 
of the Appointments Clause. "Violation of the Appointments 
Clause occurs not only when ... Congress may be aggrandizing 
itself (by effectively appropriating the appointment power over 
the officer exercising the new duties), but also when Congress, 
without aggrandizing itself, effectively lodges appointment 
power in any person other than those whom the Constitution 
specifies."82 Although Justice Souter has in mind instances when 
Congress vests appointment power in a lower-level executive 
branch official, Justice Scalia extends the anti-abdication princi-
ple to include any situation in which Congress transfers ap-
pointment authority to an entity not listed in the Appointments 
Clause. In Edmond, Justice Scalia further underscored this pur-
pose when, for the Court, he described the Clause as "designed 
to preserve political accountability relative to important gov-
. ,83 
ernment assignments. 
Thus, in these recent cases, the Court has reaffirmed the 
dual functions of the Appointments Clause first identified in 
Buckley v. Valeo. First, the Clause protects the President's con-
trol over the execution of the laws, primarily by serving as a bar-
rier to congressional efforts to interfere with the President's se-
lection and management of his subordinates. Second, the 
Clause serves an accountability purpose by requiring that any 
official who exercises "significant authority on behalf of the 
80. Id. at 759 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883). 
81. Weiss, 114 S. Ct. at 766 (Souter, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 770 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
83. Edmond v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1573, 1581 (1997). 
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United States" must be appointed an Officer of the United 
States pursuant to Article II, Section 2. This principle enhances 
government accountability by clarifying the lines of responsibil-
ity within the federal government, and by holding all officials 
who exercise federal power responsible to the people's elected 
representatives. 
B. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION AND POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY 
To be sure, the Court's elaboration of the purposes of the 
Appointments Clause has arisen in cases in which the govern-
mental interests involved might not rise to the level of those at 
stake in the foreign affairs context. The Court's case law on the 
Appointments Clause, however, deserves to be taken seriously 
because it reflects the Constitution's safeguards for representa-
tive democracy and government accountability. These funda-
mental principles require that anyone who exercises the power 
of the government ought to be appointed by, and accountable 
to, officials who themselves are elected by and responsible to 
the American people. Requiring that all individuals who exer-
cise federal power are federal officers is fundamental to the 
Constitution's concept of a national government that is not itself 
the sovereign, but is only the representative of the people. 
1. Background of the Constitution. As the Court has ob-
served, the appointment of government officials was of great 
concern to the framers. The history of the Appointments 
Clause, however, is more than just a simple story of popular 
constraint on executive power. When taken in context, the Ap-
pointments Clause can be seen as a reaction against excessive 
legislative power as well.84 Further, the Clause represents a mis-
trust of all governmental power, and indeed embodies the fun-
damental relationship between the people and government offi-
cials as one between a principal and its agents. This Section will 
examine the history of the Clause, and then identify and elabo-
rate upon its popular sovereignty roots.85 
84. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 904 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) ("The Appointments Clause is, intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation 
on Congress."). 
85. The legislative history of the Appointments Clause as it relates to the anti-
abdication principle has not received extensive scholarly treatment in the law reviews. 
Two helpful articles are Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmak-
ing: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Coun, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1079 (1988), and Theo-
dore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 
Syracuse L. Rev. 1037 (1987). 
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The revolutionary generation bore substantial suspicion of 
the Crown and its exclusive control over appointments. The 
eighteenth century English "Whig Science of Politics," as Pro-
fessor Gordon Wood calls it, laid the seedbed for revolutionary 
ideology, which feared that those in power would abuse their 
authority to oppress the people and suppress their liberties.86 
The American revolutionaries rejected the concept that sover-
eignty resided in the King or the government; rather, sover-
eignty rested in the people themselves, and the Crown and the 
executive magistracy existed solely to pursue the public good. 
One way in which the Crown improperly had projected its 
power over the colonists was by appointing colonial officials, 
who were widely viewed as corrupt and oppressive. Recall one 
of the complaints of the Declaration of Independence against 
King George III: "He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, 
and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat 
out their Substance."87 
At the ideological heart of the Revolution was the idea of 
popular sovereignty. Rejecting the concept that sovereignty was 
vested in the Crown or in the government, the revolutionaries 
believed that governments "deriv[ ed] their just Powers from the 
Consent of the Governed," and that when a government abused 
these powers, "it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it, and to institute new Government."88 Although the true sov-
ereign, according to the political theory of the day, had to pos-
sess unlimited, indivisible, and final authority, the people could 
delegate power to government officials within clearly delineated 
boundaries. These officials, however, were not the sovereign 
themselves but were only the agents of the people, who pos-
sessed the ultimate power in society.89 The Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 1780, which served as a model for the Federal Con-
stitution of 1787,90 codified this understanding: "All power 
86. See generally Wood, Creation at 3-45 (cited in note 11). In fact, some revolu-
tionary thinkers believed that such abuse of power was inevitable because of the ten-
dency in human nature to seek power over others. See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Ori-
gins of the American Revolution 55-93 (Belknap Press, 1967). 
87. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
88. ld. This separation between the sovereignty of the people and the delegated 
power of the rulers is also expressed in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the Consti-
tution, which, as I have argued elsewhere, protect majoritarian rights against an abusive 
and oppressive central government. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amend-
ment, 42 Emory L.J. 967, 970-99 (1993). Cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten 
Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987). 
89. See Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1429-37 (cited in note 11). 
90. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167,232-34 (1996). 
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residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, 
the several magistrates and officers of government vested with 
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are the sub-
stitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them."91 
The British constitution's allocation of the appointment 
power offended popular sovereignty in two ways. First, ap-
pointments were made by the King, who was not accountable to 
the people. Of course, this problem would not have been cured 
by transfer of the appointment power to the Parliament, for the 
colonists believed that they also did not enjoy any representa-
tion in the imperial legislature. Second, colonial officials ap-
pointed by the King were not members of the colonial commu-
nity, but instead were individuals sent from an almost foreign 
land to rule in America. "There is," wrote John Adams in 1776, 
"something very unnatural and odious in a Government 1000 
Leagues off. An whole Government of our own Choice, man-
aged by Persons whom We love, revere, and can confide in, has 
charms in it for which Men will fight. "92 
Popular sovereignty demanded that all officials wielding 
government power be drawn from the people and that they be 
appointed by those accountable to the people. The colonists' 
experience with written charters of government already had ac-
customed them to the idea that government could exercise only 
limited powers delegated by the sovereign.93 Like the corporate 
relationship between principal and agent, then, government offi-
cials could act only within the prescribed boundaries of the 
powers delegated by the people. As Alexander Hamilton wrote 
in The Federalist No. 78: "No legislative act therefore contrary 
to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm 
that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is 
above his master; that the representatives of the people are su-
perior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of 
powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but 
91. Mass. Declaration of Rights, Art. V (1780). 
92. John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 17, 1776, reprinted in Lyman H. Butter-
field, ed., 1 Adams Family Correspondence 411 (Belknap Press, 1963), quoted in Wood, 
Creation at 78 (cited in note 11). Although subjects of the British empire, the colonists 
by 1776 had come to see royal officials as instruments of a foreign government and as 
the products of the manipulation of politics and society by the distant, corrupt English 
monarchy. Id. at 78-80. On the colonial dissatisfaction with the powers exercised by 
royal officials, see Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 63-91 (Vintage 
Books, 1970). 
93. Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 175-98 (cited in note 86). 
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what they forbid." 94 To make the principal-agent relationship 
between the people and federal officials even clearer, Hamilton 
concluded: "the Constitution ought to be preferred to the stat-
ute, the intention of the people to the intention of their 
agents. "95 
Initial efforts to rewrite the state constitutions to incorpo-
rate principles of popular sovereignty were unsuccessful. One of 
the reactions of the revolutionaries upon breaking with the 
Crown was to relocate the power of appointments, with unfor-
tunate results. As part of a general reaction against executive 
power,96 early constitution-writers decided to transfer the ap-
pointment power from the executive to the state assemblies. 
Virginia, for example, in its Constitution of 1776 declared that 
the two houses of the state legislature would exercise the power 
to appoint all judges and the Attorney General.97 Pennsylvania 
gave the appointment power over all judges and civil and mili-
tary officers to a twelve-member executive council elected by 
the people.98 These structural experiments proved disastrous. 
As Professor Wood has observed, "[t]he appointing authority 
which in most [state] constitutions had been granted to the as-
semblies had become the principal source of division and faction 
in the states."99 To cure this "vice of the system," constitution-
writers in New York and Massachusetts, who rejected legislative 
supremacy in favor of a balance with an independent executive, 
returned the appointment power to the state Governors, with 
the participation of a council of state.100 These reforms, particu-
larly the strengthening of the executive at the expense of the 
94. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 524 (Wesleyan 
U. Press, 1961). 
95. Id at 525. In Federalist No. 39, James Madison also defined a republican form 
of government to be "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly 
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their offices 
during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior." The Federalist at 251 
(cited in note 94). One characteristic of such government, Madison further observed, is 
"that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the peo-
ple." 
96. See, e.g., Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 222-28 (cited in note 90) (describing structural 
changes in executive's ability to make war); Willi Paul Adams, The First American Con-
stitutions: Republican Ideology and the making of the State Constitutions in the Revolu-
tionary Era 271 (Rita and Robert Kimber trans., U. of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
97. Virginia Constitution (1776), reprinted in Francis N. Thorpe, ed., 7 The Federal 
and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 3816 (Govt. Print 
Office, 1909). 
98. Pennsylvania Constitution§ 19-20 (1776), reprinted in Thorpe, 5 Federal and 
State Constitutions at 3086-87 (cited in note 97). 
99. Wood, creation at 407 (cited in note 11). 
100. Id. at 433-34. 
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legislature, had a powerful influence on the delegates to the 
Philadelphia constitutional convention.101 
2. The Constitutional Convention and Ratification. In de-
vising a new Constitution, the Philadelphia delegates confronted 
the task of developing an appointments system that effectuated 
popular sovereignty without duplicating the failures of the state 
constitutions. Delegates rejected early proposals, such as the 
Virginia Plan, that sought to vest the appointment power in the 
national legislature.102 James Madison's effort to locate the 
authority in the Senate met with early support,103 but in the end a 
shared arrangement between the President and the Senate 
(proposed by Alexander Hamilton) prevailed.104 Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts hit upon the "Advice and Consent" 
language, which ultimately was adopted-along with the idea of 
presidential nomination accompanied by senatorial confirma-
tion- in the waning days of the Convention.105 
Delegates approved today's Appointments Clause in order 
to enhance government accountability. Placing the appointment 
power in the President alone was thought to risk tyranny, while 
vesting it solely in the legislature, it was feared, would "give full 
play to intrigue & cabal."106 As James Wilson put it, "intrigue, 
partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences" 
of "appointments by numerous bodies."107 The text of the provi-
sion attempts to address these dual concerns not only by placing 
the power to nominate solely in the hands of the President, but 
also by allowing an appointment to be completed only with 
senatorial confirmation. As Governeur Morris declared during 
the Philadelphia Convention, "as the President was to nominate, 
there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, 
there would be security." 1~ 
101. Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 229-30 (cited in note 90); see also Charles Coleman 
Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789 at 34-38 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1922); 
Federalist 26 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 167 (cited in note 94). 
102. Max Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 119-47 
(Yale U. Press, 1937). For more detailed descriptions of the history of the Appoint-
ments Clause, see Gauch, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 341-58 (cited in note 43); Blumoff, 37 
Syracuse L. Rev. at 1061-70 (cited in note 94). 
103. Farrand, 1 Records at 120 (cited in note 102). 
104. Id. at 128. 
105. 2 id. at 38, 44, 495, 539. 
106. 3 id. at 42. See also 1 id. at 119, 120 (statements of James Wilson and James 
Madison). 
107. 1 id. at 119. 
108. 2 id. at 539. 
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Debate over the Appointments Clause during ratification 
clarified the framers' intent to create a system that enhanced 
public accountability over the exercise of federal power. Anti-
Federalists criticized the proposed arrangement because it gave 
the Senate too much executive authority, which they believed 
would undermine the separation of powers.109 Alexander Hamil-
ton responded in the Federalist Papers by emphasizing that the 
location of the appointment power in the presidency would 
promote openness and responsibility in the filling of national of-
fices. Because a nomination would be submitted to the Senate, 
"the circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode of 
conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and 
the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been 
performed by the different actors. "110 If, for example, a poor 
nominee was sent forward, then "the blame ... would fall upon 
the president singly and absolutely."111 If, on the other hand, the 
Senate were to reject a fit candidate, "[t]he censure ... would lie 
entirely at the door of the senate."112 If an unsuitable nominee 
were to be appointed, then both branches would suffer at the 
hands of the public. "If an ill appointment should be made the 
executive for nominating and the senate for approving would 
participate though in different degrees in the opprobrium and 
disgrace. "113 Hamilton specifically contrasted the benefits of the 
Constitution with the secrecy that attended the appointment 
process in New York state, in which "an unbounded field for ca-
bal and intrigue lies open," and "all idea of responsibility is 
lost. "114 
To be sure, the Appointments Clause serves a checks-and-
balances function by dividing the appointment power between 
two branches of the national government. This was the focus of 
The Federalist No. 76, which was the companion piece to The 
Federalist No. 77. This purpose, however, should not obscure 
the provision's equally important goal of constraining the ac-
tions of the national government as a whole. As Publius' com-
ments in No. 77 suggest, the Appointments Clause seeks to 
109. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Conven-
tion of the State of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, Pennsylvania Packet 
(Philadelphia), Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1 The Debate on the 
Constitution 546-47 (Library of America, 1993). See also Jack N. Rakove, Original 
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 270-75 (Knopf, 1996). 
110. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 517 (cited in note 94). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 518. 
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make public the process of appointment in order to bring re-
sponsibility and accountability to the operations of the federal 
government. By opening appointments to public scrutiny, the 
Constitution ensures that those who are to exercise federal 
power-the agents of the people-will be carefully evaluated, 
and that any officers who abuse their powers will be held re-
sponsible. This meaning becomes even clearer when one con-
siders that the next paper in the series, Federalist No. 78, dis-
cusses judicial review as an additional method for ensuring that 
"the intention of the geople" is "to be preferred" to "the inten-
tion of their agents." 1 Both the Appointments Clause and judi-
cial review work together to ensure that the federal government 
does not seek to aggrandize its powers or conceal their improper 
use. 
3. Other Constitutional Structures that Promote Government 
Accountability. Two other structural provisions promote the 
Appointments Clause's goal of advancing government account-
ability. First, the Constitution creates a unitary executive 
branch that demands that all federal officials remain subject to 
the control of the President, who along with the Vice-President 
is the only nationally-elected member of the government. Ef-
forts to delegate federal power outside the executive branch 
may violate not just the Appointments Clause, but also Article 
Il's vesting of the executive power in the President alone.116 
Second, the Constitution nowhere provides for the delegation of 
public authority outside of the national government. Most of 
the scholarship and judicial decisions concerning the non-
delegation doctrine concern the standards that must accompany 
the transfer of authority to executive branch agencies. Non-
delegation principles, however, may also be offended by the 
transfer of authority completely outside the government without 
any standards at all. 
American constitutional scholars have been conducting a 
vigorous debate concerning the nature of the presidency and of 
the unitary executive.117 One side advances a "formalist" ap-
115. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 525 (cited in note 94). For a dis-
cussion of the original understanding of the purpose of judicial review as checking fed-
eral usurpations of power at the expense of the states, see generally John C. Yoo, The 
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997). 
116. Printz v. United Stares, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
117. See, e.g., MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725 
(1996); Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994). 
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proach that emphasizes that the Constitution creates three 
branches-executive, legislative, and judicial-which are to ex-
ercise independently the three distinct powers-again executive, 
legislative, and judicial- that lie within their domains. 
"Functionalists" reject a rigid tripartite structure in favor of a 
more flexible approach. They provide substantial discretion to 
the political branches to arrange and share government powers, 
so long as they do not violate clear textual allocations of power 
and function to the different branches.118 
An effort to transfer power outside of the federal govern-
ment would raise constitutional difficulties under either the 
formalist or functionalist models. A formalist would argue that 
the administration of federal law, such as enforcing treaty obli-
gations or conducting criminal investigations, is an executive 
power that must be exercised by the President or those respon-
sible to him. Any delegation of law enforcement authority to an 
individual who is not a member of the executive branch and who 
is not removable by the President, therefore, violates the separa-
tion of powers.119 The Court applied this mode of reasoning to 
find that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law 
was unconstitutional, because it vested an executive power-the 
authority to identify required spending reductions-in the 
Comptroller General, who was found to be controlled by Con-
gress because he was removable by joint resolution.120 As with 
the Appointments Clause, the purpose behind centralizing all 
law enforcement in the President is to render those who exercise 
government authority accountable to the public, which can hold 
118. This division in the scholarly community has mirrored the Supreme Court's 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory approach to the separation of powers. For 
example, in cases such as INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714 (1986), the Court invalidated the legislative veto and the automatic recission 
device of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law because they unconstitutionally vested ex-
ecutive functions outside the executive branch. In cases such as Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), however, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel and of the Sentencing Guide-
lines commission in the face of formalist attacks. Although it may be futile to predict 
these matters, formalism seems to be on the rebound, as demonstrated in Metropolitan 
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501 
U.S. 252 (1991) and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, lnc.,ll5 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). 
119. See, e.g., Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L.J. at 593-99 (cited in note 117); see 
also Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Ex-
ecutive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1166 (1992); Lee S. Liberman, Morri-
son v. Olson: A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 
313, 353-54 (1989). 
120. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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the President responsible for his or her actions through the elec-
toral and political process.121 
A functionalist approach might yield a similar result. In the 
leading functionalist case, Morrison v. Olson,122 the Court upheld 
the establishment, within the Justice Department, of an inde-
pendent counsel who could not be removed by the President ex-
cept "for good cause." The Court emphasized that the removal 
restriction was constitutional because it did not "impede the 
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty" to exercise 
the executive power and to see that the laws are "faithfully exe-
cuted. "123 The President continued to enjoy the power to control 
and supervise the independent counsel, the Court found, be-
cause as an executive officer the independent counsel still re-
mained subject to removal. "This is not a case in which the 
power to remove an executive official has been completely 
stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the 
President to ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws."124 Be-
cause of this removal authority, even if diluted, the President 
still "retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is com-
petently performing her statutory responsibilities."125 
Morrison v. Olson assumes that the separation of powers 
would not permit the complete insulation of an officer exercis-
ing executive authority from presidential removal. Otherwise, 
the President would be deprived of his ability to control the 
members of the executive branch and to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed.126 Furthermore, observing that law enforce-
ment is a core executive function, the Morrison Court found that 
the President's supervision and control over all law enforcement 
officers had to be maintained in order for the separation of 
powers to be respected.127 To be sure, functionalists are willing 
to accept a dilution of the presidency's removal authority in or-
der to promote other valuable government interests. Even aca-
121. On this point, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Founh Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 597 (1984); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. a. Rev. 41; Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The 
Independent Counsel Mess, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
122. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
123. Id. at 691-92. 
124. ld. at 692. 
125. ld. 
126. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations 
of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 74-
75 (1990). 
127. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696. 
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demic supporters of the functionalist approach, however, likely 
would object to the complete delegation of authority outside the 
executive branch, because it would upset the values of balance 
between the branches, of government accountability, and of 
government efficiency that they believe the separation of pow-
ers promotes. 128 
Indeed, both formalist and functionalist theories would be 
offended by a transfer of power outside the government because 
of their shared interest in enhancing accountability in govern-
ment. Accountability is advanced by the participation (either 
alone or joint) of the Congress and the President-the two 
branches that are chosen by the electorate-in the formulation 
and the implementation of federal policy. Policy is made either 
by the Congress, which is subject to bicameralism and present-
ment, or by the President, who is the representative of the na-
tional polity-especially in the age of the "plebiscitary presi-
dency."129 Each branch monitors the other, and, where 
necessary, checks the other's power through the use of the veto, 
the purse, or oversight. When the branches conflict with each 
other, the public remains informed about the government's op-
erations and about whom to hold accountable. These benefits of 
public lawmaking are lost if authority is vested outside the fed-
eral government to individuals who are not responsible to the 
electorate. 
A second constitutional principle that reinforces the Ap-
pointments Clause is the non-delegation doctrine. The Supreme 
Court has held that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows 
Congress to delegate portions of its enumerated powers to the 
executive branch.130 Such delegations often take the form of 
administrative action or rulemaking in areas in which Congress 
has provided only general principles. Congress may not dele-
gate such authority, however, unless it has stated an objective, 
prescribed methods to achieve the objective, and articulated in-
telligible standards to guide administrative discretion.131 These 
requirements attempt to guarantee, at least in a loose sense, that 
courts will be able to evaluate whether the power is being exer-
cised within the limits of the delegation. Such standards prevent 
Congress from wholly abdicating its constitutional responsibility 
128. Flaherty, 105 Yale L.J. at 1777-ffl (cited in note 117). 
129. See Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unful-
filled (Cornell U. Press, 1985). 
130. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
131. Mistretta v. United Stares, 488 U.S. 361,371-75 (1988). 
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to formulate policy and ensure that Congress will remain re-
sponsible to the electorate for its policy choices. Although the 
Court has not invalidated a congressional delegation of author-
ity since the New Deal, the Justices continue to observe that 
Congress cannot transfer legislative authority without some 
meaningful standards. 132 
Such concerns are exacerbated when Congress attempts to 
delegate authority to individuals or entities that lie outside the 
national government. Congress cannot enforce its standards 
through the usual legal or political methods when the recipient 
of the delegated power is not responsible to Congress, the Presi-
dent, or any other federal authority. Neither Congress nor the 
public has ready means of monitoring the performance of non-
governmental individuals or of measuring their conduct against 
intelligible standards. Delegation to private parties undermines 
the public-regarding nature of federal power and risks the cap-
ture of government policy by private interests. Fearing this re-
sult, the Court in 1935 and 1936 struck down statutes that at-
tempted to give the force of law to regulatory codes and 
standards promulgated by industry and labor groups.133 As the 
Court stated, since "one person may not be entrusted with the 
power to re§ulate the business of another, and especially of a 
competitor," 34 such delegation "is unknown to our law and is ut-
terly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties 
of Congress." 135 
Like the Appointments Clause, the non-delegation doctrine 
furthers dual objectives. First, the doctrine ensures that the ex-
ecutive branch will not enjoy complete discretion in the exercise 
of delegated power. This also prevents Congress from sidestep-
ping the checks on its own lawmaking power by transferring it 
completely to the President. Second, the non-delegation doc-
trine enhances accountability in public policymaking by opening 
up the lawmaking process to public review. By requiring bicam-
eralism and presentment of all laws, the Constitution creates 
132. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-75. 
133. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
134. Carter, 298 U.S. at 311. 
135. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 537. Although on only a sporadic basis, 
the Court has maintained its suspicion of such delegation. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 
the Justices invalidated a Massachusetts law that gave a church a veto over liquor li-
censes for establishments located within 500 feet of the church. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). As 
one observer has commented, "(t]he judicial hostility to private lawmaking ... thus rep-
resents a persistent theme in American constitutional law." Laurence H. Tribe, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law 369 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). 
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"institutional inertia" against the initial formulation of policy, 
which is overcome only by substantial political effort, which it-
self draws public attention.136 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in 
The Federalist No. 73 in defending the presidential veto: "The 
oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the 
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less 
must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due 
deliberation, or of those misteps which proceed from the conta-
gion of some common passion or interest. "137 
Efforts to transfer federal authority to an entity outside the 
federal government undermine the principles of the unitary ex-
ecutive, of the non-delegation doctrine, and of the public ac-
countability they both seek to promote. If the American people 
disagree with the manner in which such federal power is exer-
cised, they have no political avenue to influence the individuals 
who wield that power. This Section has sought to demonstrate 
that the Appointments Clause requires that individuals who ex-
ercise substantial federal authority must undergo appointment 
pursuant to the Clause. This conclusion is supported both by 
the Court's decisions interpreting the Clause and by the princi-
ples of public accountability and democratic self-government 
that form the Constitution's structure. Requiring that all who 
act under color of federal law undergo appointment renders 
them subject to the control of national officials who ultimately 
are elected by the people. This ensures that the people will have 
a voice in the administration of federal law by influencing the 
selection and removal of their agents. 
III 
The Constitution's principle of government accountability, 
and its expression in the Supreme Court's modern reading of the 
Appointments Clause, create significant difficulties for the im-
plementation of the CWC. Simply put, the CWC requires the 
vesting of federal power in officials who are not responsible to 
the American government. The case of the CWC, however, also 
highlights ambiguities in the Court's interpretation of the Ap-
pointments Clause and in the scope of the government account-
ability principle. This tension between the Appointments 
Clause and the demands of international multilateral agree-
136. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va. 
L. Rev. 1, 25-29 (1982). 
137. Federalist 73 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 495 (cited in note 94). 
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ments must be resolved if the nation is to pursue further its ef-
forts to integrate itself into supranational organizations. 
A. APPLICATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE TO THE 
ewe 
If the Court were to apply its Appointments Clause test as 
it has in its recent cases to the ewe, the treaty appears to be 
constitutionally suspect. First, the CWC grants the power to 
search American facilities and sites to officials of an interna-
tional organization who are not appointed pursuant to the Ap-
pointments Clause, who are not members of the executive 
branch, and who are not accountable to the President. Second, 
the treaty grants the authority to select the locations to be in-
spected to the Technical Secretariat. Their decisions neither are 
made by officers of the United States subject to standards es-
tablished by federal law, nor are they reviewable by an Ameri-
can official appointed by, and accountable to, the President. In 
other words, the ewe establishes an entity that exercises public 
authority upon American citizens without the constitutional 
safeguards designed to preserve government accountability. 
To determine whether the CWC inspection teams are sub-
ject to the Appointments Clause, we must examine whether they 
exercise significant federal authority. Upon first glance, it ap-
pears that the members of the Technical Secretariat and its in-
spection teams are exercising some type of federal power. The 
inspection teams enter the facilities and sites in question and 
conduct searches. Although American officials may accompany 
the inspection teams, it is clearly the team members who decide 
what is to be examined, who walk through a facility and examine 
its contents, who review documents, who interview facility per-
sonnel, and who run tests. Federal law forbids facility operators 
and private citizens from interfering with the freedom of access 
of these inspectors; indeed, the targets of the search are required 
by law to provide their full cooperation. In the domestic con-
text, it is federal law that gives federal law enforcement officials 
the authority to enter private property to conduct searches.138 
Here, it is also federal law-specifically the CWC and its im-
plementing legislation- that grants a similar authority to the 
Technical Secretariat's inspection teams. Furthermore, the 
138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (authorizing "officer" to enter premises if refused 
entry in order to execute search warrant). It should be noted that § 3109 is limited to 
entries by officers of the government. 
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CWC's implementing legislation imposes criminal and civil pen-
alties for violations of the Convention that are discovered by the 
inspection teams. 
In addition to its function as the inspector, the Technical 
Secretariat also enjoys the authority to choose the locations to 
be searched. Under the treaty and the implementing legislation, 
the Technical Secretariat may select any search target without 
the possibility of review by an American official. Neither the 
ewe nor the implementing legislation contain any legally-
enforceable criteria that can guide or contain the discretion of 
the Technical Secretariat. The Secretariat need not explain its 
reasons for demanding a search nor must it evaluate whether 
some level of probable cause exists to justify an inspection. In 
fact, some of the searches are to be conducted at random; these 
searches by their very nature will not be undertaken on the basis 
of any level of probable cause or articulated suspicion of wrong-
doing. No American agency can review or block the Secretar-
iat's decision to search a location within the United States' ju-
risdiction. 
We can see the significance of the authority involved in se-
lecting locations by contrasting the freedom of the Technical 
Secretariat with the constraints placed upon similar decisions 
made by domestic law enforcement. Although domestic law en-
forcement agencies also enjoy the power to conduct searches, 
this power is subject to three discrete checks. First, the Consti-
tution itself requires that the searches be reasonable, and gener-
ally that they be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describ-
ing with garticularity the places, persons, and things to be 
searched.1 Second, subject to certain exceptions, the law en-
forcement agency cannot conduct the search until it receives the 
warrant from a judicial officer, who has the authority to review 
the facts and showings of probable cause de novo and to refuse 
to issue a warrant.1-i() Third, even if a warrant has been issued 
and a search conducted, courts may choose to suppress the evi-
dence Rroduced if they find that the search was unconstitu-
tional.1 
These multiple constraints on the authority of domestic law 
enforcement to conduct searches reflect the Constitution's con-
139. U.S. Const., Amend IV. 
140. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
141. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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cern with the power of the national government in the law en-
forcement area. Furthermore, the political process imposes an 
ultimate check upon the ability of law enforcement to conduct 
searches of private homes and businesses. If the electorate dis-
approves of the manner in which prosecutors or police are con-
ducting searches, it can remove them (if elected) or the elected 
representatives who supervise them. The people also can bring 
these abuses to the attention of Congress, which could hold 
oversight hearings and use its appropriations power to terminate 
funding for abusive searches.142 The Political Safeguards protect 
not just federalism, but the separation of powers and individual 
. h 11143 ng ts as we . 
Vesting authority to conduct searches in an international 
organization may evade this fundamental political check on do-
mestic law enforcement. Members of the Technical Secretariat 
cannot be held accountable by members of the United States 
government or by the American electorate. If the Technical 
Secretariat were to abuse the inspection process, the American 
public would be unable to exert any control over the officials 
who are exercising that power. The President has no authority 
to remove members of the Secretariat, federal law forbids inter-
ference with the inspection teams, and Congress cannot use its 
funding power to curb the Secretariat's activities. This result 
undermines the basic purposes of the Appointments Clause, as 
identified by the Supreme Court in Weiss: to guarantee that the 
people have a voice in the appointment of those officials who 
wield federal powers, and to allow the public to hold its elected 
representatives accountable for "an ill appointment."144 
142. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A 
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 281-313 (U. Chicago Press, 
1980) (describing methods available to Congress to check executive branch). 
143. I am not arguing, however, that these political safeguards are exclusive. In-
stead, as I argue elsewhere, the political process should serve as a primary obstacle to 
unconstitutional government action, to be supplemented by judicial review. See Yoo, 70 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115). 
144. Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 517 (cited in note 94). 
In fact, some of the concerns raised by critics of the CWC, such as the theft of trade 
secrets in violation of the Fifth Amendment or the violation of the rights of privacy se-
cured by the Fourth Amendment, see Rotunda, 15 Const. Comm. at 149-59 (cited in 
note 6), stem from the failure to observe the principle of government accountability. 
For example, the Takings Clause guarantees that if the government takes property, it 
must pay just compensation-a rule that applies to intellectual property as well as to real 
property. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 (1986); Ruckelhaus 
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). If international inspectors, however, steal 
confidential business information, aggrieved American parties will be unable to seek a 
monetary remedy .because members of the Technical Secretariat are not considered to 
be officials of the federal government. Such inspectors would not be liable under either 
120 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.15:87 
B. WHO IS SUBJECf TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
This analysis is subject to two criticisms of the Court's ap-
proach to the Appointments Clause, one focusing on who is an 
appointee and the other on the nature of significant federal 
power. First, one might argue that the Court has applied its test 
only in situations when the individual involved was already an 
official of the federal government. Under this interpretation, 
the only question in the Court's cases was whether the official 
had to undergo appointment pursuant to Article II, Section 2, or 
whether he or she could exercise federal authority without an 
appointment of constitutional dimension. 145 Delegations of 
authority to non-federal actors, therefore, do not implicate the 
Appointments Clause because these individuals are not already 
members of the federal government. 
This theory, however, makes little sense of the Court's 
cases concerning the Appointments Clause and the executive 
power. It would allow Congress and the federal government to 
escape the requirements of the Clause simply by vesting author-
ity in private individuals, rather than in appointees who are al-
ready members of the federal government. Furthermore, it 
would allow Congress to fragment the authority of the unitary 
Presidency by transferring power to individuals beyond the con-
trol of the executive branch. For example, Buckley v. Valeo 146 
apparently could have been avoided if Congress only had vested 
the Federal Election Commission's authority in private indi-
viduals, such as members of Common Cause, rather than in offi-
cers of Congress. Or, to take another example, Bowsher v. Sy-
the Federal Tort Claims Act, which applies only to employees of the federal govern-
ment, Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (defining "federal agency" and 
"employee of the government" for purposes of tort liability), or under state common 
law, because of their international immunity under the ewe. The exclusionary rule 
would prove of little use if the plaintiff was never brought up on criminal charges. This 
result, in fact, may be a good reason to replace the exclusionary rule with a damages ac-
tion for Fourth Amendment violations in this context. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.757, 811-16 (1994). It is even uncertain if 
evidence provided by non-governmental actors in this context could be suppressed. See, 
e.g., United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search 
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §1.8(g) at 213-19 (West, 2d ed. 1987) 
(discussing if Fourth Amendment applies to searches by foreign police). 
145. This was the argument raised by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Le-
gal Counsel in response to claims that the ewe presented Appointments Gause prob-
lems. Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 104-859, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 81-95 (1996). 
146. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
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nar141 would have been unnecessary if only Congress had thought 
of vesting the authority to identify automatic spending cuts in 
the Brookings Institution, rather than in the Comptroller Gen-
eral.148 Military court-martials would not be subject to constitu-
tional challenges if Congress only had given the authority to 
conduct court-martials to the American Bar Association, rather 
than to civilian employees of the federal government. Under 
the Court's reasoning, vesting such power in private individuals 
completely outside of the control of the executive branch and of 
the national government would create even more severe consti-
tutional difficulties than those that actually occurred in these 
cases.
149 
A critic of the Court's Appointments Clause jurisprudence, 
however, might respond by pointing to the example of state en-
forcement of federal law. Almost from the beginning of the Re-
public, the federal government has turned to the states for assis-
tance in the implementation of federal programs and in the 
enforcement of federal criminallaw.150 If these state governors 
and officials are not appointed as officers of the United States, 
147. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
148. See Krent, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 79 (cited in note 126). 
149. In defending the constitutionality of the CWC, the Justice Department pro-
duced a memo that attempted to narrow the natural interpretation of Buckley and its 
progeny. Hearings on the Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention at 82-94 (cited in note 145). The Clinton administration argued that the Ap-
pointments Clause does not apply to an individual unless that person already occupies a 
position of employment within the federal government. Contrary to Buckley, the ad-
ministration believes that the Appointments Clause analysis ought to be decoupled from 
the question of what authority is vested in the official. For support, OLC resuscitated 
three cases: United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15.747); 
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879), and Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 
(1890). 
These cases provide little support for the administration's interpretation. First, they 
only discuss the difference between officers of the United States on the one hand, and 
employees of the United States on the other, rather than the question of whether ap-
pointment must accompany the delegation of federal power. Second, none of these 
cases involved situations in which a federal statute delegated substantial authority and 
discretion to the official in question. It is quite clear that the individuals in Germaine 
and Auftmordt were acting in only a ministerial or advisory capacity, and that they exer-
cised no independent authority or discretion under federal law. In this respect, contrary 
to the views of the OLC memo, Germaine and Auffmordt are quite consistent with the 
reading of Buckley advanced by this paper. Indeed, United States v. Maurice, which was 
decided by Chief Justice John Marshall while sitting as a circuit judge, supports the prin-
ciple articulated by Buckley. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. at 1214 ("If, then, the agent of fortifi-
cations be an officer of the United States, in the sense in which that term is used in the 
constitution, his office ought to be established by law, and cannot be considered as hav-
ing been established by the acts empowering the president, generally, to cause fortifica-
tions to be constructed."). 
150. Krent, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 80-84 (cited in note 126) (surveying various con-
gressional statutes and practices). 
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and their enforcement of federal law is not unconstitutional, 
then it must be possible to delegate federal authority outside of 
both the executive branch and the national government.151 Some 
supporters of a functionalist approach to the separation of pow-
ers have relied upon this line of reasoning to argue that the 
President need not have complete authority over the execution 
of all federal law.152 If, for example, the President cannot re-
move state governors or supervise their enforcement of federal 
law, then the Constitution does not require that the President 
possess similar power over everyone who exercises federal 
authority. 
It should be noted at the outset that delegating federal 
authority to state officials does not raise the same accountability 
concerns involved with the CWC. State officials are still respon-
sible to the people of a state; indeed, because of their closer 
proximity to the electorate, state officials may be even more re-
sponsive to their constituents than federal officials.153 In the con-
text of joint federal-state programs, delegating authority to state 
governors actually may buttress the purposes of the Appoint-
ments Clause, because it provides the people with two sets of 
representatives to hold responsible. So long as the federal gov-
ernment is not "commandeering" state officials and is not hiding 
its own responsibility for certain decisions, 154 state and federal 
cooperation may have the effect of enhancing democratic self-
government, rather than, as in the case of transferring federal 
power to non-governmental officials, undermining it. 
State officials, moreover, may not even implicate the Ap-
pointments Clause because they may not be "exercising signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."155 
State governors exercise authority pursuant to their own office 
as state officials rather than pursuant to any federal office. Fed-
eral law may not add to their powers in any way; their actions 
only have the result of achieving federal policy goals, but may 
not depend on federal law for their legal force. For example, 
151. See, e.g., Memorandum for the General Counsels of the Federal Government 
from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Re: The Constitutional Separation 
of Powers between the President and Congress (May 7, 1996) (on file with author). 
152. See, e.g., Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 19, 31, 69 (cited in note 117). 
153. See, e.g., Yoo, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493-1500 
(1987); David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 58-106 (Northwestern U. Press, 1995). 
154. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
u.s. 144 (1992). 
155. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
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when a state law enforcement officer enters a residence to con-
duct a search for illegal drugs, he must rely upon the powers 
granted to him by the state for the authority to enter the resi-
dence, even if he happens to discover evidence that is later used 
in a federal prosecution. Otherwise, Congress could grant 
authority to any individual, even a private citizens, to conduct 
searches and investigations even though he is not accountable to 
the President or any other elected official.156 
C. SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL AUTHORITY 
A more difficult problem is presented in determining when 
an exercise of federal power implicates the Appointments 
Clause. The Court's case law suggests that every exercise of 
federal power must be undertaken by a federal official, and 
when that power is substantial, it must be undertaken by an offi-
cial who has received appointment pursuant to Article II, Sec-
tion 2. This approach, however, provides insufficient guidance 
in the face of the complex nature and forms of federal power 
that exist today. Extending the Court's approach to the Ap-
pointments Clause to harder cases may suggest ways in which 
the ewe might be implemented consistent with constitutional 
requirements. 
First, every action and decision taken by individuals in-
volved with the federal government need not constitute the ex-
ercise of significant federal authority. Members of government 
advisory commissions or task forces, for example, do not appear 
to exercise federal authority sufficient to require appointment as 
Officers of the United States, even though their recommenda-
tions might exert a significant influence on federal policy.157 Ac-
156. This appears to be the reasoning underlying the Court's discussion of the ap-
pointment power in Printz v. United States, 117 S. a. 2365 (1997). In that case, the 
Court concluded that Congress could not force state executives to enforce federal law 
because, in part, to do so would place federal law enforcement outside the control of the 
President. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court: "The insistence of the Framers upon 
unity in the Federal Executive-to insure both vigor and accountability-is well known. 
That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to re-
duction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply 
requiring state officers to execute its laws." ld. at 2378 (citations and footnote omitted). 
The Court appeared to believe that state officials might be able to enforce federal law 
voluntarily, but that Congress could not actually vest authority in state officials to do so 
because of the threat to executive power. Id. at 2378 n.12. If that is the case, then the 
authority of state executives must derive from their own office, rather than from any 
power to exercise federal authority. 
157. See, e.g., Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing whether First Lady and health care task force were 
federal officers or employees subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act). 
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tions by federal employees also do not involve substantial exer-
cises of federal power because they are acting under the direc-
tion and supervision of an appointed officer; otherwise, by defi-
nition, they would require appointment as federal officers. 
Moreover, not every action by a proprietary government entity, 
such as Amtrak, necessarily qualifies as the exercise of signifi-
cant federal authority, although its conduct is governed by the 
Bill of Rights and its directors are federal appointees.158 
Second, every exercise of federal power may not demand 
the involvement of a federal official. Our legal system, for ex-
ample, sometimes tolerates the activity of private parties who, 
through their private actions, advance federal interests. For ex-
ample, when private plaintiffs enforce their rights under federal 
law in a federal court, the government can be said to have vested 
some amount of power in private parties. We might even char-
acterize their actions as enforcing the public interest or the pub-
lic policy of the United States. Nonetheless, we would not think 
of private plaintiffs as exercising such significant authority under 
the laws of the United States that they would qualify as Officers 
of the United States. Instead, we consider the plaintiffs as act-
ing on their own accord as private citizens, even though they ex-
ercise the discretion of whether to bring suit and how to conduct 
the litigation. 159 
This issue also arises when non-federal actors conduct 
searches and provide evidence that is used in a subsequent fed-
eral prosecution. In Burdeau v. McDowell, for example, the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment restricts only govern-
ment searches and not searches conducted by private parties.160 
Although a number of exceptions exist to the rule, such as joint 
searches involving police participation,161 Burdeau permits pri-
158. See, e.g., Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) 
(Amtrak subject to the First Amendment). Six of Amtrak's eight directors are ap-
pointed by the President, with four of them receiving the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. In concluding that Amtrak should be subject to constitutional restrictions, the 
Court observed that Amtrak "is not merely in the temporary control of the Government 
(as a private corporation whose stock comes into federal ownership might be); it is es-
tablished and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal gov-
ernmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal governmental appoint-
ees." I d. at 398. 
159. But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially-
restrictive covenants under state common law constitutes state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
160. 256 u.s. 465 (1921). 
161. See, e.g., United States v. Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982); Corngold v. 
United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure at §1.8(b) at 178-
92 (cited in note 144) (discussing and collecting cases). 
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vate parties to provide evidence to federal prosecutors 
(although state officials may not do so free from the constraints 
of the Fourth Amendment).162 Thus, searches by common carri-
ers, such as airlines or package services, do not constitute the 
exercise of government authority, because they are private par-
ties relying upon their common law rights to inspect passengers 
or goods that they transport. 163 Similarly, searches by public 
utilities to monitor the condition of equipment do not constitute 
government action, because the inspections are undertaken pur-
suant to common law or contractual rights. 164 Finally, courts 
have held that evidence supplied by foreign police produced by 
searches on foreign soil do not fall within Fourth Amendment 
restraints, unless American officials participate in the search.165 
These cases at the outer edges of federal authority provide 
examples of the arguable exercise of governmental power that 
do not appear to rise to the level where they must be carried out 
by Officers of the United States. For purposes of this paper, the 
question remains whether the powers and activities of the 
CWC's Technical Secretariat are more similar to these examples 
than to those addressed by the Court in Buckley and its progeny. 
Two factors emerge when we attempt to account for these situa-
tions within the framework established by the Court's Appoint-
ments Clause case law, which may suggest ways to harmonize 
the CWC's implementation with the Constitution's principle of 
government accountability. First, we can draw a distinction be-
tween situations in which an entity has been given authority, un-
der federal law, to affect the rights of third parties, and those in 
which it has not. 
For example, a federal advisory committee or task force 
generally neither acts upon the constitutional rights and duties 
of private parties nor has the power to force private parties to 
obey their commands. Here, federal law requires private per-
sons to allow the ewe inspection teams onto their property, re-
162. The Court abolished the so-called "silver platter" doctrine in 1960. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (exclusionary rule includes evidence supplied by state 
search which, if conducted by federal officials, would violate Fourth Amendment). 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974). If common carriers are acting pursuant to gov-
ernment orders, however, then they may be considered to be government actors. See, 
e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
164. Perez v. Autoridad de Energia E/ectrica de Pueno Rico, 741 F. Supp. 23 (D. 
Puerto Rico 1990). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. 
LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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quires cooperation with the search, and forbids interference with 
their movements and activities. In this respect, members of the 
Technical Secretariat wield power on a par with that enjoyed by 
federal law enforcement officers. Unlike the example of utilities 
or common carriers, the inspection teams' authority to search 
does not derive from any common law or contractual rights that 
arise because of a service that they provide to facility owners. 
Instead, the Technical Secretariat enjoys authority that Con-
gress has delegated to it by legislation- in other words, they are 
acting under color of federal law. 166 Limiting the reach of the 
Appointments Clause in this way-by applying it only to offi-
cials who are vested with discretionary authority to affect the le-
gal rights and duties of private parties-is consistent with the 
Court's case law and helps explain examples that do not appear 
to require the involvement of a federal officer. 
Congress could pull the ewe away from the reach of the 
Appointments Clause by abandoning the decision to vest inspec-
tion teams with the official authority to conduct searches under 
color of federal law. Instead, the ewe implementing legislation 
could attempt to alter the common law rights of property own-
ers such that they could not exercise their power of exclusion 
upon the inspection teams. While such an action might lie 
within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the re-
distribution of property rights on such a broad scale might pres-
ent substantial Takings Clause problems. Alternatively, Con-
gress could create a cause of action that would allow the 
Technical Secretariat to sue for the right to enter property be-
cause of the harm posed by the suspected presence of chemical 
weapons. This scheme, however, would deny the speed and se-
crecy demanded by the ewe verification mechanism. A better 
approach would require the Secretariat to enter into voluntary 
agreements with every facility that falls within the ewe inspec-
tion categories, in order to gain their consent to a search. Rely-
ing upon direct CWC-facility agreements might solve the Ap-
pointments Clause problem, because the authority for a search 
would derive from a contract rather than from federal law. This 
alternative, however, might present difficulties for the execution 
of challenge searches, which by their nature might include non-
consenting facilities. 
166. a. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action in deci-
sion by school, funded almost exclusively by the state, because of absence of delegated 
state authority). 
1998] CWC AND THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 127 
Second, we might explain the Appointments Clause's 
"significant federal authority" prong as extending only to situa-
tions involving a core government function. In other words, the 
Clause could be read to require appointment when a federal of-
ficial is exercising his or her authority in an area that is consid-
ered to be a central government activity, but not when an offi-
cial is engaged in an activity that falls outside our conception of 
such functions. Thus, the federal government's supervision of 
Amtrak may not implicate the Appointments Clause, because 
operating a railroad may not lie at the core of a government 
function, but rather constitutes the participation of government 
in a proprietary activity. To be sure, as the Court has suggested 
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,167 it is difficult 
to draw an exact line between "traditional" government func-
tions and propriety functions. Nonetheless, the Court in more 
recent cases has displayed a willingness to identify areas of gov-
ernment authority at the state level so significant that they must 
remain free from federal control.168 Printz v. United States might 
be read, for example, as assuming that law enforcement is such a 
core government function that the federal government cannot 
commandeer a state's police force for federal purposes. Dele-
gating the authority to enter and search private property for 
purposes of discovering violations of the criminal laws may rep-
resent a similar intrusion into a core government function. 
At a minimum, government functions that only federal offi-
cers may perform ought to include areas of authority that the 
Constitution allocates to the executive branch. Enforcing this 
principle would address the Court's concern in its Appointments 
Clause cases about congressional efforts to strip power from the 
unitary executive, and it would satisfy the Constitution's re-
quirement of government accountability. Thus, the power to 
engage in military hostilities must rest solely in the federal gov-
ernment's hands, both by virtue of the President's Article II, 
Section 2 Commander-in-Chief power and by the Article I, Sec-
tion 10 bar on state war-making.169 Similarly, the federal gov-
ernment could not delegate the authority to negotiate treaties or 
to appoint judges to private persons, although certainly the 
167. 469 u.s. 528, 543-46 (1985). 
168. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Printz v. United States, 117 S. a. 2365 (1997); see also 
Yoo, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (cited in note 115). 
169. See Yoo, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 252-56 (cited in note 90). 
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President could seek advice on such matters from non-
governmental entities or individuals. 170 
These considerations indicate that the ewe implicates the 
executive branch's control over the government function of law 
enforcement. As the Court observed in Morrison v. Olson, con-
trol over federal law enforcement and prosecution is linked to 
the President's executive power and his obligation to "take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed." Because prosecution and 
law enforcement have been functions typically and historically 
undertaken by the executive branch, Congress could impose 
only a limited good cause restriction on the President's freedom 
to remove the independent prosecutor.111 In its state action 
cases, the Court also has recognized that law enforcement is a 
government function that cannot be delegated to private indi-
viduals free of the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment.m 
The Technical Secretariat's statutory authority to enter and 
search the premises of American facilities in search of breaches 
of the ewe, for which criminal sanctions would attach, appears 
to be the functional equivalent of the power of federal officers 
who have the responsibility to investigate violations of federal 
law. 
A description of the problem suggest a possible cure. If the 
core government function here centers on law enforcement and 
prosecution, then the ewe may be harmonized with the Consti-
tution by detaching its searches from the coercive power of the 
state. First, implementing legislation could place more reliance 
for the legal authority for a ewe inspection upon the consent of 
a facility owner, rather than upon a statutory requirement that 
all owners must permit members of the Technical Secretariat 
upon their property. Second, the Technical Secretariat still 
might be permitted to search under color of federal law, but 
only if any incriminating evidence found could not be used in a 
prosecution against the facility owner. Such evidence could be 
170. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 
(1989). 
171. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("There is no real dispute that the 
functions performed by the independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they 
are law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within 
the Executive Branch."). But see Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Execu-
tive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 Yale L.J. 1069 (1990). 
172 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on 
State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 Wash. 
u. L.Q. 757. 
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used, of course, to demonstrate a breach of U.S. treaty obliga-
tions under the ewe, but allowing the Technical Secretariat to 
supply evidence, obtained on American soil under color of fed-
eral law, to prosecute an American citizen, would represent the 
performance of a public function allocated solely to the federal 
government.173 De-coupling the verification purpose of ewe 
inspections for international treaty purposes from the purpose 
of achieving domestic law enforcement and prosecution objec-
tives, therefore, could alleviate the objection to the Convention 
raised by the Court's Appointments Clause doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has sought to analyze a potential stumbling 
block of constitutional proportions to the multilateral verifica-
tion mechanism of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has 
described the Supreme Court's growing jurisprudence in the 
Appointments Clause area, and it has linked the doctrine to the 
principles of government accountability that inform the consti-
tutional design. Reconciling the constitutional requirement of 
government accountability with the demands of multilateral 
treaty obligations will require the adjustment of either the 
Court's approach to the Appointments Clause or the implemen-
tation of the Convention. 
How the problem addressed in this paper is resolved will 
have a significant impact on the nation's ability to conduct its 
foreign policy in the future. The CWC's reliance upon an inter-
national organization, rather than on state parties, to conduct 
verification will serve as a model for future multilateral agree-
ments. It is probable that future multilateral arms control 
agreements will contain similar provisions for intrusive on-site 
verification by international inspectors.174 Such verification 
mechanisms are likely to spread beyond the arms control area to 
other international regulatory treaties, particularly those con-
173. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1%0) (abolishing "silver platter" doc-
trine that allowed federal courts to receive evidence from state law enforcement officials 
obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment standards); United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 
1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (permitting introduction in federal court of evidence obtained by 
foreign police on foreign soil pursuant to foreign authorization); LaFave, 1 Search and 
Seizure at §1.8(g) at 213-19 (cited in note 144) (discussing cases). 
174. Efforts to renegotiate the Biological Weapons Convention have included calls 
for such verification mechanisms. Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty at 179 (cited in 
note 42). 
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cerning the environment.175 As with the CWC, the objective is to 
ensure compliance not just by national governments, but also by 
private parties within the state. As Abram and Antonia Chayes 
have observed, while "[s]uch treaties are formally among states, 
and the obligations are cast as state obligations ... [t]he real 
object of the treaty . . . is not to affect state behavior but to 
regulate the activities of individuals and private entities."176 The 
future also may bring on-site verification mechanisms in the 
context of international labor standards and of human rights, or 
any other area in which an international agreement seeks to 
regulate private activity. As the United States decides whether 
to further this process, it will need to address how the Constitu-
tion will allow it to accept the international commitments of a 
new multilateral world. 
175. If, for example, nations wish to reduce the emission of a certain substance, an 
international organization might be created to monitor whether industrial facilities and 
businesses are violating specified limits on the production and use of that substance. 
Both the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which seeks 
to phase-out the use of CFCs, and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, which imposes limits on the emission of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, 
fit within the model of international regulatory agreements that seek to monitor the use 
of certain substances by domestic industries. See, e.g., David D. Caron, Protection of the 
Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International Environmental Law, 14 
Hastings Inti. and Comp. L Rev. 755 (1991) (describing verification regime for Mont-
real Protocol). One can view the verification procedures of the International Conven-
tion for the Regulation of Whaling and the Antarctic Treaty as further steps toward the 
use of intrusive on-site inspections in the context of international regulatory agreements. 
On the regulation of whaling, see Patricia Birnie, ed., International Regulation of 
Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of 
Whale Watching (Oceana Publications, 1985). For recent developments, see David D. 
Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 Am. J. Inti. 
L. 154 (1995). On Antarctica, see Christopher C Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra, eds., 
The Antarctic Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988). 
176. Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty at 14 (cited in note 42). 
